Proposal for Settlement: Florida's Rule 1.442 Fee-Shifting in PIP Cases and New York's CPLR 3220

A proposal for settlement is one of the sharpest cost-shifting tools in Florida civil practice, and a 2021 decision from Florida’s Fifth District Court of Appeal shows just how much money rides on it in first-party PIP litigation. The court enforced a proposal for settlement served in a small claims PIP suit and sustained a $76,000 attorney fee award in favor of the insurer. For New York no-fault practitioners, the case is a useful mirror: it shows what aggressive, enforceable fee-shifting looks like — and how little of it exists under the CPLR.

Key Takeaways

• Florida’s Fifth DCA held that Rule 1.442, by its own terms, “applies to all proposals for settlement authorized by Florida law,” including PIP suits filed in small claims court.
• The insurer did not need to specifically invoke Rule 1.442 for its proposal for settlement to be enforceable, and the result was a $76,000 attorney fee award for Progressive.
• Rule 1.442 contains its own supremacy clause: it “supersedes all other provisions of the rules and statutes that may be inconsistent.”
• New York’s closest analogue, CPLR 3220, is a far narrower device, and no comparable fee-shifting engine operates in New York no-fault litigation.

The Decision

CENTRAL FLORIDA MEDICAL AND CHIROPRACTIC CENTER A/A/O RONALD SEALEY vs PROGRESSIVE AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, Case No. 5D21-29 (Fla 5th DCA 2021)

“Unlike other rules of civil procedure, Rule 1.442 clearly specifies the cases to which it applies. Despite the general statement of Rule 1.010, Rule 1.442 very clearly and unambiguously states that it “applies to all proposals for settlement authorized by Florida law.” As set forth above, Florida law is clear that proposals for settlement are authorized in PIP cases filed in small claims court. Therefore, by its own terms, Rule 1.442 would apply in this case. Even if Rule 7.020 could be read to conflict with or contradict this conclusion, Rule 1.442 resolves any such conflict: “This rule … supersedes all other provisions of the rules and statutes that may be inconsistent with this rule.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.442(a). Because the rule by its very terms applies to actions filed in small claims court, we find that Progressive was not required to specifically invoke Rule 1.442 in order for its proposal for settlement to be enforceable.”

This was a $76,000 attorney fee award for Progressive. See CPLR 3220.; Kirchoff-Consigli Constr. Mgt., LLC v Dharmakaya, Inc., 186 A.D.3d 585, 586 (2d Dept. 2020)

The Legal Framework: Offers That Carry Consequences

Most American jurisdictions have some version of an offer-of-judgment device. The concept is simple: a party serves a formal offer to resolve the case for a stated amount, and if the opposing party rejects it and then fails to beat the number, cost consequences follow. The theory is that litigants should bear the financial risk of overplaying their hand.

Florida’s proposal-for-settlement regime puts real teeth in that theory. As the Fifth DCA’s opinion reflects, a properly served proposal can support a substantial attorney fee award — here, $76,000 in a PIP case that began in small claims court. The court refused to let the small claims forum, or the absence of a specific invocation of Rule 1.442, defeat the proposal’s enforceability. The rule’s own text settled both questions.

New York has nothing comparable in routine no-fault practice. CPLR 3220 permits a party defending a contract claim to serve an offer to liquidate damages conditionally; if the claimant proceeds to trial and fails to obtain a more favorable result, the claimant pays costs and expenses incurred from the time of the offer. The Second Department’s decision in Kirchoff-Consigli, cited above, illustrates how narrowly that device operates in practice. CPLR 3221 (offer to compromise) is similarly modest — it shifts statutory costs, not the kind of attorney fee exposure that changes settlement behavior.

Why This Matters for No-Fault Carriers and Providers

In New York no-fault litigation, the fee economics run almost entirely one way. A prevailing provider recovers a regulatory attorney fee under 11 NYCRR 65-4 on top of the claim, while a carrier that wins recovers essentially nothing for the defense spend. There is no mechanism that makes a provider think twice about rejecting a reasonable offer and litigating a small bill to verdict.

The Florida model flips that calculus. When a rejected proposal for settlement can convert a modest PIP suit into a five-figure fee judgment against the offeree, both sides price their positions honestly and early. Cases settle because the cost of being wrong is real.

For claims professionals who handle both states, the contrast matters operationally. Litigation strategies built around Florida-style fee leverage do not translate to New York, where volume no-fault suits — like the summary judgment battles that dominate the motion calendars — must be won on the merits rather than settled under fee pressure.

Practice Pointers

• Florida side: serve the proposal for settlement early and draft it strictly to rule. The Fifth DCA enforced the device even in small claims court and even without a specific invocation of Rule 1.442, but technical compliance with the rule’s content requirements remains the usual battleground.
• New York side: do not assume any rejected offer creates fee exposure. CPLR 3220 and 3221 shift limited costs and expenses in defined circumstances; budget defense costs accordingly.
• Carriers: track defense spend on commodity no-fault suits. The absence of fee-shifting in New York is an argument for early, claim-level resolution strategies rather than scorched-earth litigation of small bills.
• Providers’ counsel: the same asymmetry is leverage — but remember that the regulatory fee under 11 NYCRR 65-4 is capped, so running up litigation hours rarely pays.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is a proposal for settlement?

A proposal for settlement is a formal written offer to resolve a case for a stated amount. In Florida, if the opposing party rejects the proposal and fails to obtain a sufficiently better result, the offering party can recover attorney fees — in this PIP case, $76,000.

Does New York have an equivalent to Florida’s Rule 1.442?

Not really. CPLR 3220 lets a defending party offer to liquidate damages conditionally, and CPLR 3221 permits an offer to compromise, but both shift only limited costs and expenses. Neither creates the attorney fee exposure that drives settlement in Florida practice.

Why don’t rejected settlement offers shift attorney fees in New York no-fault cases?

New York follows the American rule — each side bears its own attorney fees absent a statute, rule, or contract saying otherwise. In no-fault litigation, the only routine fee award is the regulatory fee a prevailing provider recovers under 11 NYCRR 65-4; there is no reciprocal fee remedy for carriers.

Related Resources

• Fee schedule defense in New York no-fault litigation
• The firm’s Legal Encyclopedia
• No-Fault insurance defense practice
• Understanding the CPLR 3212(g) paradigm for summary judgment proceedings
• Critical timing rules for summary judgment motions under CPLR 3212(a)
• When reasonable excuse satisfies default judgment despite jurisdictional claims
• No-fault verification requirements and partial compliance standards
• New York No-Fault Insurance Law