CPLR § 4518 Business Records: The New York Practitioner's Guide

Last reviewed: June 2026

Key Takeaways

• CPLR § 4518(a) is New York’s business-records exception to the hearsay rule. The foundation has three elements: the record was made in the regular course of business, it was the regular course of that business to make the record, and the record was made at or about the time of the act or event recorded.
• The maker’s availability is irrelevant. A business record is admissible even though the person who prepared it could testify (Rodriguez v New York City Tr. Auth.).
• The witness’s lack of personal knowledge of the underlying facts goes to weight, not admissibility — but the witness must actually know how the records were generated, not merely recognize them.
• Records created by a different entity are the modern battleground: the proponent must show the records were incorporated into and relied upon in its own business (Carothers v Geico and its progeny), not merely received and forwarded.
• Uncertified police accident reports are inadmissible, and even certified reports may contain hearsay-within-hearsay that must independently qualify.
• Not everything needs a 4518 foundation. Contracts, assignments of benefits, declaration pages, and letters offered only to prove they were mailed are non-hearsay and need only authentication.

What CPLR § 4518 Says

CPLR § 4518(a) makes a writing or record admissible as proof of the acts, transactions, occurrences, or events it records if the court finds (1) it was made in the regular course of a business, (2) it was the regular course of that business to make the record, and (3) the record was made at or about the time of the act or event. “Business” is read broadly — commercial enterprises, hospitals, government agencies, professional offices. The statute expressly provides that all other circumstances of the record’s making — including the affiant’s or witness’s lack of personal knowledge of the contents — affect the weight of the record, not its admissibility. Electronic records qualify on the same terms as paper.

CPLR § 4518(c) provides a second path for certain categories of records — hospital records, records of government departments and agencies, and similar materials — which may be admitted by certification in lieu of a live foundation witness. The certification route is procedural shorthand, not a relaxation of the underlying business-records requirements.

The exception rests on a reliability rationale: businesses depend on the accuracy of their own routine records, so records made under a business duty carry circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness that excuse the absence of cross-examination. Where that business duty is missing — a bystander’s statement in a police report, a printout nobody entered in the regular course of business — the rationale collapses and so does admissibility.

How New York Courts Apply CPLR § 4518

This firm has been writing case notes on § 4518 since 2009. What follows synthesizes that body of decisions, with links to the underlying analyses.

The preparer’s availability is irrelevant: Rodriguez

The decision that anchors this guide is Rodriguez v New York City Tr. Auth., 2011 NY Slip Op 01258 (2d Dept. 2011):

“We agree with the defendant that the Supreme Court erred in precluding it from introducing into evidence two accident reports. The accident reports were made in the regular course of business and were admissible under CPLR 4518(a). A business record is admissible even though the person who prepared it is available to testify to the acts or transactions recorded.”

Rodriguez rejects a persistent misconception: that if the record’s creator can be produced, the record itself becomes inadmissible and live testimony must be substituted. The business-records exception provides an independent ground for admission, and the strategic choice about which witnesses to call remains with the parties. An opponent’s objection that “the person who made this is available” is simply not a basis for exclusion.

The foundation witness must know how the records were generated

The flip side: producing a witness is not enough. In V.S. Med. Servs., P.C. v Travelers Ins. Co., the Appellate Term excluded a plaintiff’s claim forms because its former employee “did not testify at all as to the generation of such claim forms.” Familiarity with what records say is not familiarity with how they are made.

The Appellate Term delivered the textbook statement of the rule in All Borough Group Med. Supply v Geico: a witness who was employed during the relevant period and could describe the office routine — that delivery receipts and claim forms were routinely and contemporaneously made — laid a sufficient foundation even though his testimony was “inartful,” and his lack of personal knowledge of particular transactions affected weight only.

The witness also need not work for the original record-maker in the corporate sense. In Yellow Book of N.Y. v Cataldo, an employee of the plaintiff’s successor-in-interest who was “fully familiar with the plaintiff’s record-keeping procedures and practices” properly authenticated the predecessor’s records.

Records made by someone else: the incorporation doctrine

The hardest-fought § 4518 territory is foundation for records created by a different entity. The leading New York treatment came out of no-fault litigation: Carothers v Geico, where a billing company’s witness could not authenticate the medical provider’s claim documents because the billing company “did not incorporate plaintiff’s records into its own records, but merely received, printed and mailed them.” Carothers overruled the lenient Pine Hollow “conduit” approach and installed a strict incorporation test: receipt is not incorporation; the records must be absorbed into and relied upon in the proponent’s own business.

The doctrine now runs through every corner of civil practice:

• Liquidation: In A & S Med. Supply v MVAIC, the Appellate Term held that the New York Liquidation Bureau could lay a foundation for a defunct insurer’s seized records because its claims examiners actively used those records to administer outstanding claims — incorporation and reliance, not mere custody.
• Foreclosure: In Bank of America v Brannon, the First Department accepted a servicer-side affidavit reciting familiarity with the plaintiff’s record-keeping systems and reliance on the loan file in the regular course of business — over a dissent that, on a technical reading of 4518(a), had the better of the argument on familiarity with the antecedent entity’s record-keeping.
• Assigned debt: In Portfolio Recovery Assoc. v Lall, the First Department let a debt buyer’s employee lay a foundation for the original creditor’s account statements and affidavit of sale based on the buyer’s reliance on those documents — no “special relationship” with the assignor required. (The Fourth Department’s Unifund CCR Partners v Youngman points the other way; the departmental split persists.)
• Criminal/forensic contexts: The Fourth Department’s decision discussed in our note on People v Jones excluded a bank-screen printout and database-search testimony where the People showed neither that the data was entered in the regular course of business nor that the witness was familiar with — and generally relied upon — the practices of the company that produced the records.

The through-line: the foundation witness must articulate familiarity with the producing entity’s practices plus routine reliance on the records. Conclusory custody is never enough; documented operational use usually is. First Department panels accept thinner affidavits than the Second Department — know your forum.

Police reports: certification first, hearsay-within-hearsay second

Police accident reports fail under § 4518 in two distinct ways. First, certification: in Hazzard v Burrowes, the Second Department held a police accident report inadmissible because “it was not certified as a business record (see CPLR 4518[a])” — and held the parties’ statements within it were independently inadmissible as self-serving hearsay bearing on the ultimate issues. Second, double hearsay: even a properly certified report only carries statements made under a business duty to report. As our 2020 note on the uncertified-report problem explains, an uncertified report containing a party’s purported admission never gets to the feigned-affidavit question — the court will not reach whether a later affidavit contradicting the roadside admission is a sham, because the report itself is out. Certify the report and match each embedded statement to its own hearsay exception (party admission, excited utterance) before relying on it.

CPLR 4518(c), government records, and the judicial-notice trap

Printouts from government websites occupy an awkward middle ground. In Throgs Neck Multicare v Mercury Cas. Co., the Appellate Term — following Dyer v 930 Flushing, LLC, 118 AD3d 742 — held that Department of State printouts are inadmissible unless certified under CPLR 4518(c), even though courts will take judicial notice of various items on government websites. Judicial notice and evidentiary admissibility are different doctrines, and the line between them remains unsettled. The practical answer is cheap insurance: certifying DOS records is easy, so do it.

When you do not need § 4518 at all

A recurring tactical error is fighting a 4518 battle over a document that is not hearsay:

• Documents with independent legal significance. An assignment of benefits, like a contract, “need only be authenticated” — no business-records foundation required (All Borough Group).
• Policy declaration pages. Part of the insurance contract; authentication plus, for electronic reproductions, a CPLR 4539 showing suffices (Brand Med. Supply v Infinity).
• Letters offered to show they were sent. EUO and IME scheduling letters offered to prove mailing, not the truth of their contents, are offered for a non-hearsay purpose (Sin Med. v Travelers). Courts nonetheless cite 4518 in mailing cases with some inconsistency.
• But proof of mailing itself has a foundation rule. Where mailing is proved through business records, the affiant must aver familiarity with the office’s standard mailing practices and procedures designed to ensure items are properly addressed and mailed — documentary exhibits alone failed in Bank of America v Wheatley.

Copies, summaries, and the best evidence rule

A qualifying business record can still founder on form. In 76-82 St. Marks, LLC v Gluck, an incomplete photocopy of a guaranty was excluded both as secondary evidence (no threshold showing of unavailability and good faith) and under CPLR 4539(a) (not satisfactorily identified as an accurate reproduction) — and a damages chart “prepared solely in anticipation of litigation” was rejected outright. Litigation-generated summaries are not business records; bring the underlying source documents.

Practice Pointers

1. Script the foundation affidavit to the three elements — regular course, regular practice to make the record, contemporaneity — and add the affiant’s basis for knowing the office routine. Track the All Borough language.
2. For another entity’s records, plead incorporation, not custody. The affidavit must describe how the records were absorbed into the proponent’s business and how its personnel rely on them daily (Carothers, A & S v MVAIC).
3. Certify police reports and DOS/government printouts before motion practice. Both certifications are inexpensive; the failure is routinely fatal (Hazzard, Throgs Neck).
4. Run the hearsay-within-hearsay check. A certified record admits only entries made under a business duty; party statements need their own exception.
5. Do not lay a foundation you don’t need. Contracts, AOBs, and declaration pages are non-hearsay; over-lawyering invites foundation objections you could have mooted.
6. For mailing, the affiant must know the mailing procedure — not just attach the ledger (Wheatley).
7. Watch the departmental split on assignor/originator records (Portfolio Recovery vs. Unifund); your foundation burden is measurably heavier outside the First Department.

Frequently Asked Questions

What are the foundation requirements for a business record under CPLR 4518(a)?

Three elements: the record was made in the regular course of business; it was the regular course of that business to make the record; and the record was made at or about the time of the act, transaction, occurrence, or event recorded. The foundation witness must be familiar with the record-keeping practices that generated the document, though the witness’s lack of personal knowledge of the underlying facts goes to weight, not admissibility.

Does the person who created the business record have to testify?

No. Under Rodriguez v New York City Tr. Auth., a business record is admissible even though the person who prepared it is available to testify. Foundation may be laid by any witness — or by affidavit or certification where permitted — who is familiar with the business’s record-keeping procedures.

Can a witness lay a CPLR 4518 foundation for records created by a different company?

Only under the incorporation doctrine. The proponent must show the records were incorporated into its own business and routinely relied upon — mere receipt, custody, or forwarding is insufficient under Carothers v Geico. Successor entities, loan servicers, liquidation bureaus, and debt buyers have all satisfied (and failed) this test depending on the quality of the reliance showing.

Are police accident reports admissible under CPLR 4518?

Only if certified as business records, and even then only as to entries made under a business duty. Uncertified reports are excluded outright, and statements by parties or bystanders within a certified report must independently satisfy a hearsay exception, such as a party admission.

Counsel-to-Counsel: Referrals and Co-Counsel

If you are litigating a CPLR § 4518 issue — a foundation fight on summary judgment, a trial objection you need preserved correctly, or an appeal turning on a business-records ruling — and want a second set of eyes, or want to hand the motion or appeal to someone who briefs these issues every week, the Law Office of Jason Tenenbaum, P.C. works with referring attorneys across New York: per-diem motion practice, appellate briefing and argument (1,000+ appeals), and co-counsel arrangements on no-fault, personal injury, and insurance coverage litigation. Referring counsel stay involved to the degree they want. Call (516) 750-0595 or use the contact form — attorney inquiries answered same day.

Related Reading

• Business records (CPLR 4518[a]) back to the Appellate Division
• No-fault prima facie case requires a business-record foundation: Carothers v GEICO
• Third-party billing records: the Appellate Term’s first application of Carothers
• Business records — when was the data entered and who could enter it?
• Policy exhaustion and the business records
• Legal Encyclopedia
• New York no-fault defense practice